Wednesday, April 08, 2009

Steanso Dusts Off His Philosophy Hat

(advance warning- I read an article in the New York Times that kind of got me thinking about some of the philosophy stuff from my undergrad days, and then I sort of geeked out and wrote this post. I'm not sure all of my arguments are even sound in this hastily written thing, and I certainly wouldn't fault anyone for not being interested enough to read much further. I'm not sure why I'm apologizing for writing this, except that I don't write much about philosophy these days, and I'm not sure I exactly put my best foot forward here....)

There was an op ed piece in the New York Times today by David Brooks about the nature of morality and moral reasoning and about how human beings form moral judgements. The column seemed a little perfunctory and reached its conclusions, in my opinion, far too quickly and without really giving opposing viewpoints their due, but the basic thrust of his argument was that humanity has now reached a new understanding of morality in which we understand that moral reasoning and moral judgments are made almost instantaneously and with a force and quickness that sort of resembles instinct or aesthetic judgment (his example is that when we look at a painting or a flower we sort of instantaneously like it or dislike it, with the reasoning about why we liked this object taking place after the fact- as a sort of way to rationalize the immediate, sort of subconscious decision making processes which led us to like or dislike the object in the first place. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to understand that Brooks' position seems to rapidly move moral reasoning closer to the realm of emotion and intuitive reaction and farther away from the realm of logic). Brooks allows for moral reasoning and for processes which eventually allow us (or require us) to arrive at a conclusion different from our initial, hastily formed first impressions, but Brooks states (without much elaboration) that such processes typically arise from social interactions in which we are presented with contrary points of view (which, of course, allows for logic in moral reasoning- Brooks doesn't seem to be completely denying moral reasoning so much as he seeks to deny its primacy in terms of describing the way that most moral decisions are made. Or maybe he's just saying that some form of peer pressure is more important in changing moral reasoning that the use of reasoning).

Personally, I think that Brooks and the philosophers that he quotes are probably hitting on something which is partially correct in providing an emotion based explanation for the workings of morality, but I think their explanation is far from complete (at least as presented by Brooks) and that it isn't giving moral reasoning its due. For starters, I think that many of the guiding principles of morality which form the basis of our moral reasoning are based upon lessons learned and logic explored in the early, developmental years of our lives. We learn early on that stealing or needlessly hurting people is wrong, and in our earlier years we hear explanations from our parents or the members of our church or our teachers about why these things are wrong (social contract theory, utilitarianism, divine law, etc.), and we think about them a bit, either accepting or rejecting their logic, and then we stow the things that we find plausible away in our memory banks and use them as the basic foundational building blocks (sort of pragmatic subroutines derived from the larger program which determines our moral principles and guides our notions of how to act justly in the world) for the decisions of morality that we'll be asked to make later in our lives. Just because we instinctively and viscerally react in a certain way to the display of a certain set of behaviors doesn't mean that we are acting on pure emotion in our actions or that we're acting out of pure instinct. I think that we construct moral positions through moral reasoning that can be relied upon later so that we don't have to spend a bunch of time thinking about these decisions later when a split second decision is required down the road in the midst of some potentially chaotic situation. Just because we have performed some moral reasoning and have incorporated some of the principles produced by that logic as deeply ingrained parts of our personality (which may help explain some of the emotions attached to these principles) or just because we have performed the moral reasoning which led to the creation of these logical principles at an earlier point in time doesn't mean that the logical processes haven't occurred or that these moral principles aren't occasionally revisited, revised, and/or updated.
There may be issues in terms of accounting for exactly why we make the decision that we do at the time that we make it, but that doesn't mean that logic and thought wasn't used in constructing moral principles which are later relied upon for split second reactions (it's kind of like playing music and knowing when to use certain notes. You may study music and notes and scales and key signatures and understand the musical theory behind these concepts and how and why everything fits together, but for the jazz musician who's in the middle of an improvisational solo- at the time that he's playing any particular note it may just "feel" right, but the only reason that it probably "feels right" in the first place is that the musician has previously done the hard work of understanding why certain notes are appropriate in certain situations when grouped together with other notes ina certain musical setting. At the moment that the musician plays the note, he may not know exactly why the note is right, but this doesn't suggest that there's no logic behind what he's playing.)
I think that we go through our mental processes and make decisions regarding what is right or morally just when we have the time for thinking about such things, but once examined, we break down the conclusions that we come to into useable bits that can be relied upon later in order to make the sort of quick decisions that real life requires. This process doesn't mean that moral judgments are based upon simple emotion. Although emotional attachments to certain moral judgments are certainly possible- it would make sense for the mind to attach certain "feelings" to the perception and analysis of situations that include a moral component in order to speed up our response processes- this doesn't mean that the basis for these feelings have not been explored or are devoid of logic.
Anyway, I recognize that this column by Brooks is brief and that he's just giving a brief summary of what are undoubtedly longer, more detailed explanations of his theories (and the theories of the colleagues with whom he is agreement), but this move to separate morality from logic strikes me as incorrect and overly simplistic, at least as presented in his column. I think that people may use poor logic or reach questionable conclusions in their logic, and I certainly think that emotions and logic can often be at odds with one another, but I think that people really do utilize and react to logic as a force in making moral decisions (even if the logic isn't utilized at the moment they react to a given situation). Personally in my own life I can remember a few things that initially struck me one way, but which I later changed my mind about, and it took some time before I sort of redeveloped emotional responses that were in keeping with what I had come to see as a new, more morally just viewpoint. Moral stances can change because of logic and emotions can change with them. I think this is more than just some glorified version of peer pressure (which seems to be, I guess, why Brooks is alluding to when he says that talking to friends is more likely to lead to moral change than an evaluation of logical considerations).

Anyway, sorry about this post, which probably is only interesting to me.

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